Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 16

Issue 3

Article 7

7-1-1999

"Religion Without Religion": Caputo, Derrida, and the Violence of
Particularity
Shane R. Cudney

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Cudney, Shane R. (1999) ""Religion Without Religion": Caputo, Derrida, and the Violence of Particularity,"
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 16 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199916338
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol16/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

"RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION": 1
CAPUTO, DERRIDA, AND THE VIOLENCE
o

OF PARTICULARITYShane R. Cudney

Jack Caputo's most recent book follows Derrida in proposing a "religion without religion", a posture that, while committed to the general structure of religion, attempts to philosophically distance itself from specific, historical exemplifications of that structure. I propose that by determining what motivates the
distinction between what is termed the "messianic" and "messianisms", a space
opens that allows us to call into question this "desert religion." I will conclude
by suggesting an alternative posture, one that attempts to honor both the universal structure of religion, and the particular, historical content of religion.

"The question is not whether there is a desir de Dieu, a passion for
God in Jacques Derrida. Who could ever doubt that? .. The question
is, rather, the one put by his North African "compatriot" 5t.
Augustine: "What do I love when I love my God?" Upon the
groundless ground of this beautiful and bottomless question ...
Derrida's life and work is an extended commentary.'"
INTRODUCTION: Religion Without Religion

In his most recent book, The Prayers and Tears of Jacqul's Derrida, John
Caputo returns to a careful and sensitive, indeed, surprising re-reading of
"Derrida's later, more autobiographical pieces,"4 a rendering which
emphasizes that "[w]e will read him [Derrida] less and less well unless we
hear the [deeply religious] yes that punctuates and accents the text, the yes
to the promise that resonates throughout all his works, a yes first, a yes
last, a constant yes. Qui, oui."" Anticipating the blow that his "academic
colleagues" and "secularizing friends" no doubt will suffer from the very
idea of linking Derrida with religion, people "for whom the only blasphemy is infidelity to Nietzsche, whom I will have shocked and traumatized
by this provocative scene of Derrida weeping at his pril'-Dil'll," Caputo
begs their pardon and implores their forgiveness in advance."
In a passionate, deconstructive bid to avoid the violence associated with
traditional, content-full "religions of the Book"/ Caputo, following
Derrida, proposes an alternative "religion without religion", a posture that,
while committed to the gl'nl'ral structure of religion, attempts to distance
itself from the Spl'cijzc historical exemplifications of that structure. In the
same way that a flower defies the rigid dictates of a concrete jungle and
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finds its way to the surface in an affirmative burst of life, deconstruction is
in the business of insinuating itself into the cracks and crevices of the present in a way that "works the provocation of what is to come, '" against the
complacency of the present, against the pleasure the present takes in itself,
in order to prevent it from closing in on itself, from collapsing into selfidentity.'" So strained and bent are the sails of deconstruction "toward
what is coming," so deep runs "its posture of expectancy, its passion for the
impossible," that it would be "absolutely" impossible for the messiah to
arrive in the flesh." This is the "law of the impossible, the 'impossiblerule,'" which means "never to confuse his coming (venue) with being present, ... never to collapse the coming of the just one into the order of what is
present or absent."lO
But what are we to make of this religion without religion, of what
Caputo will refer to as a religion of the desert; what are we to do with this
region that is haunted by the ghost of a bloodless and bodiless messiah?
What are we to "think" of the attempt to relegate religion to the realm of
reason alone,'} the desire to confine its content within the bounds of a certain abstraction?}2 Is not the attempt to "bracket" all doxa, a posture which
is itself committed to a certain ideal that inevitably harbors determinate
features? How is one able to maintain a universal religion without driving
a wedge between faith (pistis) and faith(s)? Considering that deconstruction emphasizes the retrieval of a full-bodied existence from a tradition
that has often sacrificed the particular (body) on the altar of the universal
(ideal), these are curious anomalies, to be sure.
In this paper, 1 propose that by determining the motive behind what I
will argue is a (philosophical) rift between the "messianic" and Abrahamic
"messianisms", we will be able to catch a glimpse of the elusive specter
that animates the deconstructive gesture, an "in-site" that will allow us to
call into question this "desert religion"," Of, if you will, '''prophetic postmodernism. "'}4 In so doing, I will suggest that something new is able to
emerge, a radicalized, post-Kierkegaardian-type faith, one might say, rooted in the suffering love of God, one that repeats the possibility of religion
within the limits of faith, and faith within the limits religion. This
remythologized myth of justice attempts the "impossible": to honor both
the universal structure of religion and the particular, historical instantiations of that structure.
1. 011 the "Messianic" and "Messianislns"

Part III (The Messianic) of Prayers and Tears is arguably the heart of
Caputo's text, not only because it is here that we feel its prophetico-messianic pulse, but also because it is here that we find Caputo holding
Derrida's hand to the fire of religion, a gesture he believes is necessary if
deconstruction is to be consistently deconstructive, that is, true to its original ideals, faithful to its "founding vision," if we can say such things.
Because of his increasing concern for those who fall through the cracks
and get crushed by the political and religious power structures that be, his
hyper-sensitivity to the violence done in the name of particular "messianisms" of the Marxist, neo-Hegelian, Islamic or Christian type, Derrida,
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like Levinas before him, began by the early 1990s to think in terms of of a
general "messianic" structure, "one that is cut to fit the hand of deconstruction."15 By 1994, however, Caputo observes that between the two editions
of "The Force of Law"16 Derrida had sharpened the edges of deconstruction on the whetstone of Marxism which produced a messianic structure
that took on the form of a more conventional universal, one that seemed
more distant from the nitty-gritty of particularity. With a raised eyebrow,
yet with a religious reverence, Jack the "bookkeeper" has taken it upon
himself to follow Jack the "ragpicker"17 with an outstretched hand, waiting
to catch him lest he fall into the ditch of old philosophical debates that
deconstruction is supposed to gingerly avoid. In this "game of Jacks"18 one
might irreverently say that Jack is watching out for Jack's derriere.
In final pages of Specters of Marx lq Derrida elaborates on the distinction
between the messianic and messianisms by posing the following question in
a certain, straightforward kind-of way that seems to tum, as Caputo suggests, on the classical distinction between form and content, between the Lmiversal and the particular, "between a 'universal' structure and the concrete
realization or embodiment of that struchrre, between ... 'a structure of experience' and a 'religion."'2o Derrida formulates the question as follows: "If the
messianic appeal belongs properly to a universal structure ... how is one to
think it with the figures of Abraham[icl messianism,,?n But, on Derrida's
own terms, this is a less than adequate formulation. 22 Indeed, are we really to
believe that Derrida has finally come home (Heim) to roost? Has he not
spent his entire life attempting to deprive us of the familiar creature comforts
of home? Yet, given this present formulation, Derrida does seem to pose
two possibilities: either the messianic structure precedes the concrete messianism as an "originary condition," or, the concrete messianisms come
before the messianic struchlfe as its origin. "Does Abrahamic messianism
serve as the source or origin from which we derive an abstract concept of the
messianic? Or is the messianic a condilion of possibility that antedates the
concrete messianisms which are but exemplifications of it"?23
What is important to emphasize, especially for the purpose of our discussion, is that these questions bear not only on the relationship between faith,
religion and philosophy but also on the nahue of the pre-theoretical commitments that undergird and infuse all of our theoretical endeavors. And
while there are distinct religio-prophetic overtones in Derrida's use of this
distinction, the very attempt to keep religion(s) at bay-a gap that Caputo
will creatively try to negotiate 24-betrays a certain alliance with the Western
tradition that needs to be teased out and questioned. By attempting to suspend the content that faith itself entails, is it possible that Derrida (and
Caputo) paradoxically conflates religion and faith? And could it be that the
very move which paves the way for his structural religion, is one that harbours a motive similar to that which gave rise to the traditional distinction
between faith and philosophy? We will return to these questions below.
So, the aforementioned Derridean dilemma, Caputo observes, leads us
back to a similar Heideggerian (Marburgian) formulation:
Can there be an "atheological heritage" of the biblical messianisms?
Can one strip the biblical messianisrns down to an atheological core?
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Can one, by a work of "desertification" and denuding, by a deconstructive ascesis, remove a biblical surface from a messianic structure?25
In other words, the question is whether Derrida's quasi-atheistic, messianic

is the condition for biblical messianisms,26 or an aftereffect, a distillation
derived from particular religious accounts, in which case, "[t]he messianic
in general would be a conceptual ghost, a specter of philosophy, a poor
abstraction, whose cash value is drawn from the accounts of the religions
of the Book."27
In Derrida's own (English) words, he emphasizes the difficulty that surrounds his "religion without religion", a problem that he promises to
return to, but constantly defers.
The problem remains ... whether the religions, say, for
instance, the religions of the Book, are but specific examples of this
general structure of messianicity. There is the general structure of
messianicity, as a structure of experience, and on this groundless
ground there have been revelations, a history which one calls
Judaism or Christianity and so on. That is one possibility, and then
you would have a Heideggerian gesture, in style. You would have
to go back from these religions to the fundamental ontological conditions of possibilities of religion, to describe the structure of messianicity on the ground of groundless ground on which religions
have been made possible.
That is one hypothesis. The other hypothesis - and I confess
that I hesitate between these two possibilities - is that the events of
revelation ... have been absolute events, irreducible events which
have unveiled this messianicity. We would not know what messianicity is without messianism, without these events which were
Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ, and so on. In that case singular
events would have unveiled or revealed these universal possibilities
and it is only on that condition that we can describe messianicity.28
Although Derrida insists that there exists a certain complementarity
between these two possibilities, and that he oscillates between them, I suggest that he unwittingly favours one of his sons because it "impossible" not
to, given, that is, my reading of the assumption that underlies the formulation. On the surface, at least, what allows Derrida to linger on the threshold between these two spaces, in the manner he believes he can, is the
notion that religious faith and philosophy are quite distinct from one
another. Because the philosopher can only say so much, eventually philosophy pushes against the limits of its horizon, beyond which only faith and
angels dare to tread. Indeed, whoever or whatever is calling must remain
anonymous and this anonymity is the horizon of faith. The undecidability
that surrounds the above distinction between which Derrida oscillates,
exists primarily because we are dealing here with philosophical knowledge
which by definition excludes religious faith. Even though Derrida and
Caputo insist that a religious-like trust undergirds and precedes our theorizing, their language betrays a certain "commitment" to, or shall we say,
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faith in, a rather traditional distinction. The assumption that gives shape to
this posture I will deal with in section Ill.
While Caputo is rightly concerned about the drift of deconstruction, and
has plotted in his own course, adjusting his sail accordingly, my hunch is
that because he too sees determinate religions through the lens of a religious (overarching?) structure, he is unable to pull away from Derrida's
wake.

II. On the Disjunction Between the "Messianic" and "Messianisms"
Not completely content then with swabbing the deck of the Good ship
"messianic" which purportedly leads to justice, a justice that is always to
come, Caputo has, in the spirit of Radical Hermeneutics/ 9 launched out for
himself in order to situate himself on the side of the deconstructive strait
that is closest to Kierkegaard. Inspired by the spirit of deconstruction and
religious faith, Caputo has cause to question Derrida's recent formulation
of the messianic and the implicit "either/ or" assumptions which are beginning to leak from it. In an effort to rescue deconstruction from being
drawn into "old debates" that would pull it into the whirlpool of some sort
of Jewish or even Judea-Christian philosophy, Caputo insists that these
"two standpoints complement rather than compete with each other and it
is not a matter of choosing between them."lo As we have already alluded,
it is because deconstruction "constitutes a certain anti-essentialism or nominalism" that Caputo is worried that Derrida's formulation of the question
problematizes the whole discussion by framing it "within an assured set of
distinctions ... which is the whole point of deconstruction to disturb. For
deconstruction ... ought not to be drawn into any debates about whether
facts precede essences or essences precede facts, or whether each precedes
the other but in different orders and in different ways."3!
According to Caputo, if we pay close attention to Derrida's "'absolute
events"'l2 we will see that he means something which is not a specific
instance of something more general. "In the messianic time of singularities, historical happenings are idiosyncratic 'events' and not 'moments' in a
larger, teleological or eschatological movement."" Moreover, given the
"Babelianism of deconstruction and its delimitation of the traditional idea
of translation... Derrida can hardly put himself in the position of saying
that the 'messianic' represents the overarching, universal, metalanguage
into which the various concrete messianisms can be translated."34 The
matter does get muddled, however, when Derrida goes so far as to say that
he is in search of "a universal culture of singularities"/5 "where every
other is wholly other." In this case one must ask with Caputo: what kind
of universality does he have in mind here? Indeed, how can he avoid
employing a good-old-fashioned universal in all of this? The question of
how one is to "describe the status of this indeterminability, this indeterminable messianic ... which cannot be a true or conventional or garden
variety universal",'6 is the challenge.
Faced with the seeming incommensurability of these competing possibilities, Caputo pulls the notion of "formal indication" from his erstwhile
Heideggerian hat in order to remedy the situation. This notion, he tells us,
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unlike the traditional philosophical concept which attempts to encompass
and comprehend its object, is purportedly a nonobjectifying indicator, "a
projective sketch that traces out in advance certain salient features of an
entity or region of entities .... The formal indication is not a universal that
'contains' 'particulars' 'underneath' it, but a sign ... pointing to a region
where it itself cannot enter.")e Caputo is convinced that because the "formal indication" is akin to the factical (immanent) region, it has no transcendental compulsion to control and contain the particulars in a universal
meta-net. Understanding the factical requires then a certain Einstellung, a
comportment which leaves philosophy to its own devices, whilst a
detached, philosophically and religiously stripped, ethically sensitive questioning attitude breaks through, in Heidegger's case, into the "prephilosophical" "'revolutionary' experiences" of "the New Testament and the

Nichomachean Ethics." 38
Based as it is on the fundamental distrust, indeed, violence of philosophical discourse, Heidegger employed his notion of formal indication in the
business of incessantly questioning traditional categories of thought. Thus,
he attempted to forge, as Caputo says, "a quasi-conceptuality, formed of 'formal indications' which are related to the singularity of existence, to factical
life, as imperfect sketches or anticipatory foreshadowings of a prior and irreducible excess, an excess that can only be 'engaged' or entered into existentially, not grasped conceptually."N Because the particular is not taken as an
inferior chip off the universal block, because "the singular is not a fall (casus)
from universality whose feet are soaked by the particularity of matter or
potency,""" Caputo sees this Heideggerian gesture as one that might moisten
Derrida's parched lips enough to bring him out of a state of heat exhaustion
which has induced these very spooky and disturbing hallucinations.
On this account, the messianic would be a more benevolent, modest universal, one that has no pretensions, no illusions of grandeur. However, says
Caputo, there is a certain price one pays in travelling the low road of facticity. For if Derrida were to steadfastly follow this less trodden, more difficult
path, he would have to concede that the messianic is historically conditioned, which means that he would have to admit, indeed, "confess" that it
harbors "determinable features",.! which in turn levels the ground to the
extent that his "religion without religion" would be ushered into the realm
of competing messianisms. "So rather than taking Derrida's messianic as in
any way overarching the three historical messianisms of the religions of the
Book," Caputo thinks it is more helpful to see it as "one more messianism
but with a deconstructive twist .... "H "After all," insists Caputo,
the Derridean messianic does have certain determinable features,
some of which ... it has borrowed from the prophetic tradition, and
some of which are Derrida's own invention. For Derrida's messianic
is through and through an ethico-political idea, having to do all the
way down with justice and a democracy to come, and organized
under the idea of the "new International." Having begun, like everyone else, and just as he himself predicts, where one is ... Derrida's
messianic has emerged under determinate historical conditions and
takes a determinate form:'
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III. On the Motive for the Disjunction Between the"
Messianic" and "Messiamisms"

In all of this Caputo has rightly and inventively attempted to undo the
dilemma that deconstruction seems to have worked itself into. That Caputo
has, it seems paradoxically, opened some breathing room between the two
"spaces" with the help of Heidegger's formal indication there is little doubt.
The question is: Is this necessarily a better way to keep the future from being
closed off? Is this enough of a departure from Derrida to make a difference?
Must we conclude that to minimize the inevitable violence of particular messianisms, one must "formalize" or bracket out religion? Although in Prayers
and Tears Caputo presents us with a demythologized Heidegger who has
received deconstructive "treatments," what concerns me about this alternative are the assumptions that undergird the idea that there exists some
"nonobjectifying," "atheistic," "quasi," or "certain" kind of language, a way
of thinking or poeticizing that is able to pull away from and, in effect, detach
(or, at the very least, distance) itself from the violence of discourse.
While Caputo's version of the messianic is no doubt a more humble,
modest universal, I maintain that because it drinks from the same philosophical cistern as Derrida, it does not, indeed, cannot sufficiently loosen
the ties that presently bind deconstruction. So even though Caputo has
kept the philosophical dust from settling (something he does quite well), it
seems to me that his "neutered" universal, this de-masculinized, gelded,
more subdued Heideggerianism still cannot genuinely connect with or
penetrate the surface of concrete religions, even if it can sing a little higher.
Stripped of its aggressive, violent tendencies, the problem is that this
docile, more manageable messianic is also stripped of certain, very human,
gonadian features, which also strikes me as violent.
Although Caputo assures us that on his accounting the singular is not "a
fall (casus) from universality," I suggest that the singular is a fall within particularity.44 This means (a la Heidegger) that because every philosophical
move, every decision is structurally finite, they are seen as "'cuts,'" incisions
which necessarily amputate and exclude:5 Indeed, for this reason, the very
gesture of philosophy is one of violence. With Derrida, Caputo has all
along maintained that the origin is always already fissured from the beginning, that at the origin of language, prior to empirical violence, there is the
"arche-violence" of "arche-writing" with its "harsh law of spacing" as "an
originary accessory and an essential accident.""" As such, that which is constitutive to human be-ing is considered structurally violent. Thus, to be
human is to be caught in a web of necessary violence. This construal, I suggest, is precisely what binds deconstruction, and what links Caputo and
Derrida to one another and to the tradition they rightly seek to deconstruct.
On the surface, at least, the rather obvious reason for the quasi-ascetic,
linguistic acrobatics and inventions that surround the production of
Derrida's (and Caputo's) "religion without religion" is the violence that
determinate "content-full" faiths inevitably inflict in the name of the Law,
Truth, and Messiahs. No doubt religions of the Book have a disturbing
legacy of violence, and it for this reason both Derrida and Caputo consider
it imperative to develop a general structure of justice which highlights a
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desert-like, ascetic detachment from the historical expressions of such a
structure. Derrida believes this is necessary, for
[a]s soon as you reduce the messianic structure to messianism, then
you are reducing the universality and this has important political consequences. Then you are accrediting one tradition among others and a
notion of an elected people, of a given literal language, a given fundamentalism. 47
The question of structural violence leads us back another step to the question of trust (that is, [religious] faith [Pis tis] construed here in the broadest
possible sense), to the assumption which undergirds and gives shape to the
motive to develop a general structure of religion. If the general messianic, on
Derrida's account, is the condition for specific messianisms, is it not also true
that his belief in this structure presupposes a certain trust, a certain faith in
the primordiality of the heterogenous, desert-like "placeless displacing
place"4B called kh6ra, whose sister is the messianic, the place where an a-personal justice from nowhere resides?49 And if discourse remains grounded in
faith as Derrida himself confesses in Memoirs of the Blind,S{) is it not possible to
think otherwise than of "Khora" as the condition for im/posssibility? And
might not this other birth-space produce different offspring?
In an attempt to escape the strictures of ousiology, which inevitably harbours secrets, Derrida, in his article "How Not to Speak",'1 which Caputo
highlights, has us trek to the far side of negativity where he explores the
analogy and the disanalogy of the kh6ra with the God of negative theology, a
place where we are taken to the very limits of language - and beyond.
Here Derrida paints a picture of the tension in Plato between what he calls
the "two movements or two tropics of negativity",'2 the "two opposing ways
in which philosophical thought finds itself up against its limits ... two things
equally unsayable but for quite opposite reasons."53 While the first movement presses toward that high hyper-ousiological point above the clouds
which inspires awe in both Neoplatonists and negative theologians alike, the
second movement slips under the border of being, below phenomenality,
beyond the reach of "all anthropo-theological schemes, all history, all revelation, all truth."54 This no-place called kh6ra "is neither form (idea), nor sensible thing, but the place (lieu) in which the demiurge impresses or cuts images
of the intelligible paradigms, the place which was already there," a pre-originary origin from nowhere. 55
Like the owl "Old Brown" in Beatrix Potter's classic who has a penchant
for honey which lies beyond his means to reach it, Derrida takes a keen
interest in kh6ra precisely because of its ability to "resist any analogizing or
participatory schema, to remain adrift and lost."56 "KhOra is neither present
nor absent, active nor passive, the Good nor evil, living nor nonliving." It
is "[n]either theomorphic nor anthropomorphic" rather, it is "atheological
and nonhuman .... "57 Indeed, kh6ra must have no recourse to "meaning",
"essence", or "identity." Otherwise, in the language of the gift, it becomes
implicated in the ecomony of exchange where it would take on the appearance of the giver of all good gifts, a giver that no doubt will eventually
come to collect. This re-inscription into the same goes against the "impos-
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sible-rule" because "the kh6ra is tout autre, very."ss In order then to avoid
the violence that lurks behind every tree in a "tit for tat," "dog eat dog"
jungle economy, Oerrida prefers to speak of the aridity of the desert, a
haunted place where messianic spirits love to hide.
But (seriously) what are we to make of the non-historical, historical
names of kh6ra and her sibling the messianic? How are we to "think" of
this placeless place that cannot be "assimilated into philosophy" or religion, this place that historical "things do not in any way stain or mark,"
that "belongs to a time out mind, out of memory," out of sight?59 Through
this lens, one can certainly see why Derrida and Caputo cannot say
whether kh6ra gives or does not give, and why one must ask: "What do I
love when I love my God, God or klz{)ra? How are we to decide? 00 we
have to choose?"60 As I suggested earlier, what this produces is the notion
that philosophy can only say so much. Because the philosopher can say
only so much, philosophy itself eventually pushes against the limits of its
horizon, a point at which philosophy is a little lost for words and finds
itself beginning to stutter as it looks for the exit sign.
As far back as Radical Hermeneutics,'" Caputo articulated this same sentiment when he emphasized that one cannot say whether Nietzsche (the
tragic) or Kierkegaard (the religious) is right because philosophy is not in
the business of making this kind of decision. Not surprisingly. this same
distinction is re-peated in Against Ethics where Caputo once again is
backed into a philosophical corner when he finds himself unable to say
who or what it is that calls, il or il y a. 62 Things happen, Caputo says,
"[t]hey happen 'because' (weil) they happen .... There is no 'why' .... What
happens is what there is (es gibt). That is all."63 In Caputo's latest work, the
distinction re-peats itself once again in the form of "religion without religion" a messianic without messianisms. Faith in, or "passion for the
impossible," as he calls it, must keep the messianic in the realm of the viens
for once we pull justice into the realm of the possible it is given over to distortion and violence, a place where "moth and rust doth corrupt."
On my reading, the way Caputo slices the pie (something we all of
course do if we want a piece) is reminiscient of a Thomistic gesture which
dictates that faith remain extrinsic to philosophy. If it is true that humanity
is insatiably religious, if we are fundamentally creatures of faith, whose
profound experience of both the brokenness and the goodness of life find
us hoping and praying, spiralling and re-peating forward, it is difficult to
imagine faith being absent from or extrinsic to any mode of being-in-theworld. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a "call" without a "gift," a "yes" without the strings that a symbiotic relationship necessarily entails.
It seems to me that even though Caputo and Oerrida posit a "gift," a
religio-ethical "yes" which comes before all of life and language, this "yes"
is in danger of being nullified, swallowed up by a Barthian-like "No"
which is posited against any and all determinate commitments. If it is true
that this Ankhoral"No" is synonymous with Oerrida's fractured pre-originary origin, from whence comes love and the possibility of justice? And if
justice is always to come, always "impossible," how is it that evil and violence are not conflated with goodness and thereby put on equal footing?
What else can we make of the kind of violence that" always crosses the dis-
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tance of the other," a violence that permeates and "violates the space of the
other .... "? Is not this kind of "radical evil" the stuff on which deconstruction's "desert, kh6ral, ankh6ral religion stands or falls .... "?64
It seems clear that what we are left with here is a justice that is relegated
to the realm of chance, and manifests itself only as a random flash-in-thepan event that immediately burns up upon entering our atmosphere.
What kind of justice is this? Must the beautiful thought of justice turn
immediately ugly upon its arrival? Might there be another "possibility,"
another way to navigate the deconstructive strait between the messianic
and messianism, another way to prevent the future from being closed off?
While Derrida and Caputo believe that their structural religion is the
cleanest dirty way to keep the future open, what bothers me is the same
thing that troubles me as a parent who, more often than not, finds myself in
the frustratring position of saying to my kids the very things that my father
said to me, things that I vowed I would never say. Somehow, in some
insidious way they ooze out, betraying a familial bond that runs deeper
than we would sometimes like to think. In deconstruction's zeal to purge
philosophy of its violence, I hear other voices, a cacophony of past and present voices, one of which it seems to me sanctions a neo-Scholastic bifurcation that, in its deconstructive expression, relegates religious faith to a place
that excludes it as a mode of knowing. Though, admittedly, faith knowing
cannot be reduced to philosophical knowing, I do suggest that faith permeates every mode of human experience. Whether we are witnessing a beautiful sunset, smelling cowslips in the field, or reflecting on Kierkegaard's
Concept of Anxiety, are we not always already surrendering to the experience
of the world which is the very condition of knowing the world?
CONCLUSION: Religion Within Faith

While I have no doubt that an affirmative, indeed, religio-ethical "yes"
marks the texts of both philosophers, it seems to me that this bitesized
"yes" inevitably gets swallowed up in the "heterodidactics between life
and death."6s If this is the case, might it be possible to enlarge this "yes"?
Is it possible that this affirmative "yes," can be re-thought of as an
(inter)personal, life-giving "yes"? And could we say that this "yes" is synonymous with love, a love which is the oxygen that is the very condition
for the possibility of all our particular faith(s), whatever they might be?
This shift in emphasis would highlight the reality that, because we live
in a world of both connection and disconnection, it is not a matter of oscillating back and forth in a volatile, quasi-neutral space between two
absolutes, attempting to escape the tyranny of two despots, being spooked
(Es spllkt) 66 by the "ghost of full presence.""? The focus, instead, would
become more persistently ethical, becoming a question, not of how one is
to escape violence, but of how one is to respond to the call of love. Indeed,
in this economy, the call of love is at once a "gift" that compels us to
respond, and a "caU" that can be ignored, refused and abused.
Moreover, this shift would radicalize the notion of undecidability by
highlighting the reality that human beings are inherently religious. As creatures of faith who are always already caught in the grip of precariously held
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beliefs, it makes good ethical sense to bring our particular faiths to the fore
and confess them (in "fear and trembling"). It is here, in plain view, that we
"myth-makers" will be better able to keep our stories, and their potential for
violence, in check.
Although Caputo remains religiously committed to his Ankh6ral
Religion of withdrawal, which implicates him in Derrida's dilemma, this
is not an altogether bad thing on my reading. For by conceding that
Derrida's absolute desert is unlivable, and that the messianic hope cannot
live apart from the determinable faiths, Caputo's analysis not only allows
for a certain content, it also admits of a certain genealogy and geography 68 which helps bring the messianic closer to the messianisms. For
despite his protestations to the contrary, Derrida's "religion" has very
determinable features which include an affinity for a particular form of
democracy and a very specific brand of prophetic justice. 6<J Indeed,
deconstruction itself was forged" at the end of the totalitarianisms of the
left and the right, of fascism and Stalinism .... "70
If this is the case, if we allow Caputo to have his way with Derrida, if we
admit content into Derrida's messianic structure (will he forgive us?), then
the ground would level out to the extent that, not only would the messianic
become a pharmacological site - and therefore be subject to deconstruction but concrete messianisms, by the same token, could not be written off as
essentially poisonous. This, as we have already alluded, highlights the crucial
difference between "necessary" violence and "historical" violence. Allowing
for the ubiquity of violence rather than the necessity of violence opens "a
political space which can grapple with both the possibility of peace and violence - that is, a political structure that confronts violence as violence precisely against a horizon of possible peace and justice."7l So instead of having
deterrrtinate religions be the whipping boy of the messianic, the messianic
itself is also ushered into the "beauti ful fray" as another messianism among
messianisms. In this way, we could release religion to be understood as "a
fundamentally deconstructive gesture," yet also a pharmacological site
where there exists the possibility "of both poison and cure, violence and
peace, exclusion and healing."n In other words, if Derrida cannot have his
cake and eat it too, if it is impossible to maintain his desert religion, and if we
also confess that all discourse begins in faith, then instead of dismissing out
of hand the viability of determinate religions in the call for justice, we would
be free to bring our particular faiths to the fore in order to cultivate a religioethical vigilance that has an ear bent toward the other.
Was not this kind of vigilance demonstrated, for example, by a certain
Galilean who by his own account was both prophet and priest, both human
and divine, whose kingdom is both "now" and "not yet," and whose "particular" words and work are "universal" in intent and scope?

Institute for Christian Studies
NOTES

I am grateful to the editor, the anonymous referees, Jeff Dudiak, Jim

"RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION"

401

OIthuis, and Jack Caputo, whose insightful comments and criticisms greatly
improved the quality of this essay.
1. John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Dcn'ida: Religion Without
Religion, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997).
2. It is important at the outset to emphasize that for the deconstructionist
the very gesture of philosophy is one of violence. Because the impulse of the
Western philosophical/theological tradition has been one largely focused on a
search for an unmovable centerpiece for its house of being, it is believed that
this impulse, this spirit, has all along sacrificed difference on the alter of sameness. Indeed, the discoverv of the mathematical - that most Greek of all Greek
discoveries, which itself stclnds as a paradigm for philosophical thought - at the
same time was a violent rupture that has given birth to many and varied
dualisms which the deconstructionist is particularly sensitive to and suspicious
of. As the reason, that is, logos, for what appears, this intelligible, mathematical
essence became the veritable apex of reality itself. As such, the logos becomes
first in the order of being, a throne from which this Unmediated absolute rules
absolutely. In this way, because the logos cannot help but think totality, reason
inevitably "dictates that what is is and what isn't isn't, and that what is, whatever it be, is more truly than what simply appears to be which, strictly speaking, is not at all, or, at the very least, is not really rea/''' See Gary B. Madison,
The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and Themes, (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1988). p. 129. This way of thinking, that is, logos as
causa sui, is traced along the path of development where it finds its full formulation in the modernity of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel. Since the
time Descartes set out to establish the ego as a point of absolute certainty, being
has been characterized by what Spinoza termed conatu5 essendi: "Everything,
in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being." See Benedict de
Spinoza, Ethics. in The Chicf Works of Benedict de Spinoza, trans. R. Elwes (New
York: Dover Publications, 1955). p.136. Since for Spinoza God's power is synonymous with his essence, and all things are modes of God, the will-to-power,
notes Levinas, becomes the linchpin of modern ontologies. See Emmanuel
Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969). p.46. On this reading,
what has developed over a long history is a process whereby reason has
become an instrument of terror, a tool of oppression and domination used by
an ego or a society of egos to supress what is other or different. Jacques
Derrida terms this totalizing "motif of homogeneity, the theological motif par
excellence." See Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1981). p. 228. Although this paper reflects a deep affinity and
respect for the work of Caputo and Derrida, it struggles to think otherwise on
this very crucial point of necessary violence. See part III below.
3. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. xxii.
4. Ibid., pp. xxiv-xxv.
5. Ibid., p. xxiii.
6. Ibid., p. xxvi. By strategically positioning a "formidable" circle of "secularist hermeneutic guards around the text" Caputo, after Kevin Hart, The
Trespass of the Sign, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). pp.42-47.,
argues that it is typical of Derrida's commentators to want "to make deconstruction safe for secularism .... " What deconstruction is concerned with, however, is discourse that is totalizing. "Theology has hardly cornered the market
on totalization. If there is any totalizing going on here ... it is among the secularist commentators on Derrida who would forbid the contamination or 'infestation' of good secular academic goods such as deconstruction with God." J. D.
Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 18-19.

402

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Faith and Philosophy

Ibid., p. 136.
Ibid., p. xx.
Ibid., p. xxiii.
Ibid., p. xxiv.
Ibid., pp. 154-55.
Jacques Derrida, "Foi et savoir: Les deux sources de la ({r~ligion» aux limites
de la simple raison," In La Religion, ed. T. Marchaisse (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1996). pp. 16-17. All translations are my own.
13. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 155.
14. Ibid., p.150. Although this is Cornell West's expression, Caputo thinks
it is a good "spectral image" for the convergence between the "deconstructive
resources of religion" and the "religious resources of deconstruction." See also
John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, Studies in Philosophy of Religion
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). p. 201. Even though
Caputo himself reservedly uses the term "postinodernism," he rightly considers that it has become an overused and much abused word, one that has "been
ground into senselessness by oppotunistic: overuse .... " J.D. Caputo, Prayers and
Tears, p.119. However, as a heuristic term, it does help to describe a growing
sense of suspicion and dis-ease in Western culture. From pop culture to politics, it is becoming increasingly evident that the Enlightenment myth of
progress is fast losing its ability to inspire enthusiasm and generate faith
among its advocates, the spirit of which the term "postmodern" nicely captures.
15. Ibid., p. 117.
16. Jacques Derrida, "The Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of
Authority,'" trans. M. Quaintance, in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,
ed. D. Cornell et a1. (New York: Routledge, 1992). See also Force de loi:
'Fondement mystique de l'autorite' (Paris: Galilee, 1994).
17. John 0, Caputo, Against Ethics, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1993), p. 21.
18. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. xxix.
19. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of
Mourning, and the New International, trans. P. Kamuf (New York: Routledge,
1994), p. 167.
20. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 135
21. J. Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 167.
22. J. Derrida, "The Force of Law," p. 25.
23. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 135.
24. Ibid., pp.139-143.
25. Ibid., p. 135.
26. J. Derrida, "Foi et Savoir," pp.26-27.
27. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 136.
28. Jacques Derrida, "Deconstruction and Tradition: The Villanova
Roundtable with Jacques Derrida," in Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A
Conversation with Jacques Den'ida, ed. J. D. Caputo (Bronx: Fordham University
Press, 1997). pp. 23-24.
29. John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the
Hermeneutic Project, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987). Although Caputo has
come full circle (almost) since Radical Hermeneutics, in my opinion, his religious strategizing has changed very little. Although he has since given up the
attempt to cross-pollinate Derrida's metaphorics of play and frivolity with
Heidegger's metaphorics of stillness and meditation (by injecting a "mystical
element" into the abyss of withdrawal), he still has his religious camp set up on

"RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION"

403

the side of the deconstructive mean that is closest to Kierkegaard. See Chapter
7, "Cold Hermeneutics: Heidegger /Derrida/' pp. 187-206. My modest
attempt in this paper is to merely hint at the contours of a philosophy (ethics,
politics, or whatever the discipline) that is as inescapably religious as it is
philosophical.
30. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 137.
31. Ibid., p. 138.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. J. Derrida, "Foi et Savoir/' p.28.
36. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp.138-139.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p.140.
40. Ibid.
41. J. Derrida, "Foi et Savoir," p.29.
42. J.D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 142.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 140, emphasis added. What I mean here - and this is an important point - is that whereas the postmodern critique is concerned to deconstruct
the modern assumption that particularity is an inferior chip off the universal
block (in other words, a "falljrom universality"), I contend that the valorization
of the messianic represents the flipside of the same economy, a shift that
repeats a post-Iapsarian fall into necessary violence. In this way, violence
resurfaces again in a different guise. This time as a "fall within particularity."
So, while this shift in sensitivities needfully addresses metaphysical violence, it
does not, however, address the question of structural (creational) violence, or
the difference between the two.
45. J. D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, p.196.
46. Jacques Derrida, Of Gmmmat%gy, trans. C.c. Spivak (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). pp. 112; 200.
47. J. Derrida, "Deconstruction and Tradition/' p.23.
48. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p.154.
49. On the significance of this quasi-neutral, arid-like, "khora" space that
precedes and engulfs our "yes" and "no," see Jacques Derrida, "KJlOm"; Saulle
nom/' in On the Name, ed. T. Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1995).
50. Jacques Derridll, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins,
trans. P-A. Brault and M. Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
pp. 29-30.
51. Jacques Derrida, "How Not to Speak: Denials," in Derrida and Negative
Theology, eds. H. Coward and T. Foshay, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).
52. Ibid., p. 101.
53. J. D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p.93.
54. J. Derrida, On the Name, p. 124.
55. J. D. Caputo, Pmyers and Tears, p.35.
56. J. D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p.94.
57. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp.35-36.
58. Ibid., p. 36.
59. J. D. Caputo, Deconstruction in Il Nutshell, pp.94-95.
60. J. D. Caputo, Prayers Ilnd Tears, p.37.
61. J. D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp.278-288.
62. J. D. Caputo, Against Ethics, pp.245-247.

404

Faith and Philosophy

63. Ibid., p. 223.
64. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 158.
65. J. Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. xviii.
66. Ibid., p. 172.
67. lowe this phrase to James H. Olthuis, "A Hermeneutics of Suffering
Love," in The Very Idea of Radical Hermeneutics, ed. R. Martinez (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997). p. 160.
68. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p.142.
69. J. Derrida, "Foi et Savoir," p.29.
70. J. D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 142.
7l. James K. A. Smith, "Determined Violence: Derrida's Structural
Religion," Journal of Religion 78 (April 1998): 21l.
72. Ibid.

